Can Colombia and the U.S. sever relations? That’s the question on everyone’s mind this Sunday after a political and economic storm erupted between the two nations. Early in the afternoon, reports emerged that Colombia had refused to allow two U.S. planes carrying Colombian deportees to land.
Washington responded immediately, announcing a series of measures , including tariffs of up to 25% on Colombian products, which could increase to 50% within a week.
Responses and counter-responses have unfolded rapidly. Colombian President Gustavo Petro, whom Trump described as a “very unpopular socialist president in his country,” announced tariffs on U.S. products in a lengthy statement shared on social media. Despite the tensions, Colombia also dispatched the presidential plane to repatriate Colombian migrants deported by the U.S.
If the escalation continues, given the current stance of both countries, a complete rupture of relations between Colombia and the U.S. cannot be ruled out. Beyond a trade war—which, as is often the case, benefits no one—tensions appear poised to deepen further.
When Donald Trump’s victory in the U.S. elections last November was announced, it quickly became clear that Colombia, with its first leftist government in history, would be one of the countries facing the most strained relations.
To be sure, there are strong institutionalists across the U.S. government who see Colombia, the country—not any particular government—as a long-term vital ally and strategic partner. President Joe Biden articulated this view in an April 2023 White House meeting with Petro, calling Colombia “ the key to the hemisphere.” No daylight emerged between Biden and Petro on the latter’s priorities: fighting climate change and reducing reliance on fossil fuels, fostering ethnic and gender inclusion, and bringing development and security to neglected areas of the Colombian countryside.
More recently, other senior officials emphasized Colombia’s centrality to U.S. interests. Chargé D’Affaires Francisco Palmieri told a business gathering in May that “Colombia continues to be the best ally and strategic partner of the United States in Latin America.” That month, the head of U.S. Southern Command, General Laura Richardson, praised the strong and enduring “mil-to-mil” relationship forged over decades of close institutional collaboration.
But in public and private, another group of U.S. officials—call them “the disillusioned” or even “the rejectionists”—express alarm over the direction of the Petro government’s policies, wondering if U.S. resources wouldn’t be better spent addressing crises in Ecuador and Haiti at a time of overall U.S. budget constraints. That said, perceptions about Petro may shift in a positive direction if he helps secure a democratic solution in Venezuela following the massive electoral fraud of July 28.
The biggest rift that has emerged is over counternarcotics policy, long the central driver of U.S. involvement in Colombia. Past U.S. administrations have tried to “de-narcotize” bilateral relations— trade and investment, for example, have boomed since the signing of a bilateral free trade agreement in 2012—one that Petro has vowed to renegotiate , so far without much traction.
Colombia continues to be the source of roughly 90% of the cocaine entering the United States. This figure has been unchanged since 1999 when policymakers launched the massive assistance program known as Plan Colombia. The emphasis of U.S. counternarcotics policy has shifted to synthetic opioids such as fentanyl, now responsible for the majority of overdose deaths in the U.S. But cocaine remains a priority—it is a delivery mechanism for fentanyl, increasing its lethality and abuse.
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